

University Hill Public Safety Association

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January 14, 2019

S.U. Department of Public Safety
Tabletop

10:00am

Present: President LeRoy, Messrs. Brown, Dufford, Goldacker, Goodale, Kavanagh, Petterelli, Sardino, Seburn, and Walsh

Guests: EJ Donovan, VA Hospital; Chris Dunham, SUNY Upstate Medical Center; Robert Dugan, SUNY-ESF; Brad Marmon, SUNY Upstate Medical University; Nicholas Newcomb, NYS University Police at Upstate; Richard Shoff, Syracuse Police Department; Rabin Stolusky, Crouse Hospital; John Wasiel, SUNY-ESF

Staff: David A. Mankiewicz

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

- The meeting was dedicated to a Tabletop Exercise developed by SUNY Upstate Medical University Emergency Management. The results are attached.

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I. WELCOME AND INTRODUCTIONS

Chief LeRoy called the meeting to order. He welcomed the members and guests present. The minutes from the previous meeting will be approved at the next meeting.

Mr. Dunham noted there was a recent conference of emergency management at SUNY Binghamton. As a result of that meeting, they are putting together a list of emergency management officers in Central New York in the area of Onondaga County up to Watertown in the North Country. Mr. Dunham will put these on a Listserv so people can access those.

Mr. Brown noted that the security office at Hutchings is now moved to a new location at 620 Cedar Street.

II. TABLETOP EXERCISE

Mr. Marmon went through the ground rules for a facilitated discussion. He noted that two of the items to be tested at today's event include communication and the existence of response plans at the various institutions in responding to a crisis of the type described in the tabletop.

He noted the goal was to identify communications pathways for law enforcement and to identify any resource gaps that may occur during the initial response phase of an event. They would also like to explore the integration between various organizations and understanding how incident command structures would be put in place.

The After Action Report Improvement Plan for the Tabletop is attached.

Mr. Marmon then laid out a scenario of a basketball game taking place at the Carrier Dome. The attendance was between 28,000 and 29,000 people, and there was a large snowfall which had taken place the day before.

Captain Kavanagh noted that Syracuse Police Department would have a separate significant detail which is responsible for coordinating traffic. They would have a command post that would cross the street from the Dome. Mr. LeRoy noted that there would be no parking allowed on the SUNY-ESF Campus and officers would be at check points particularly near the east side of campus by the Dome. Mr. Sardino also noted that there would be a command post, one inside the Dome and one outside the Dome. The Veterans Administration would have a normal, large detail to handle game parking.

As Mr. Marmon described the incident, there was a large "popping" noise inside the Carrier Dome. The spectators in the area begin to rush towards the exits and some people have been trampled and injured as they attempted to leave the Dome quickly. Mr. Marmon asked the members present to describe what their first concerns would be. Chief Sardino noted that for DPS, the first concern would be communication to try and understand what just happened. Captain Kavanagh noted that for the Syracuse Police Department, there would be an immediate response both from officers inside the Dome and from outside the Dome. The Syracuse Police Department would likely start calling back officers from wherever they were. He would expect that his officers inside the Dome would be moving toward the noise to determine its cause. Mr. Sardino also noted that the immediate response from DPS and the medical staff would also be to attend to the injured and to contact the building engineer to see if they can determine the cause of what took place. He noted if it was some form of an engineering or structural problem

there are cameras and sensors in the Dome that might record what the problem is. Mr. Sardino also noted that the Schine Student Center, Manley Field House and Hendricks Chapel would be open to stage people, and that attendees would be told to go to those locations to seek shelter. That message would be texted out to students and that message would be communicated by an announcement that would be made over the PA system at the Carrier Dome. Mr. LeRoy noted that SUNY-ESF officers would hear as people came out of the Dome that something had happened and ESF would also offer to house people in the Gateway Building. SUNY-ESF radios and the DPS channels would be getting the same information that DPS would.

Mr. Marmon asked the question, "at what point would the decision be made to evacuate the Dome or do you want people to stay inside?" Mr. Sardino responded in the event of some sort of collapse scenario the goal would be to get people out of the Dome and try to get them to move toward the shelters. He realized that a lot of people would head to Manley to get their cars. Centro would be called to bring the buses in to help move people. The SPD would get its outside detail back and would also work to manage the Fire Department response. Mr. Sardino noted that the shelter buildings can be opened electronically but an officer would be sent to the buildings as the building coordinators may not be there.

Mr. Marmon asked since there is at this point no explanation for what made the loud popping noise, what would be the scenario for something that involved a weapon versus a mechanical or structural failure? Mr. Kavanagh noted that SPD would immediately take charge of the investigation and they would count on their inside people to determine what had happened. Mr. Shoff noted that officers are trained to run to the area in the event there is a weapon to terminate that situation. But if there is no weapon the goal of SPD is to calm people. Mr. Kavanagh noted that if it was believed to be a crime scene the work of SPD would be to secure the site. Mr. LeRoy noted that there is video surveillance and cameras both inside the Dome and outside on the buildings whether they are Syracuse University's or others that could help identify what happened. Mr. Sardino noted if there was a structural problem it would be likely that one of the alarms on one of the building's systems would be going off. If it was an active shooter, officers would be trying to take care of it.

Mr. Marmon then advanced the scenario to say that multiple calls has been made to 911. They have stated that people have been hurt and trampled, and at this point there is noted that there is about 30 people hurt that include both ambulatory and non-ambulatory people. Syracuse Fire Department, the AMR Ambulance and SPD have arrived in response to the call. Mr. Dufford noted that Crouse would likely notice the crowds walking down Irving Avenue and probably would have had phone calls from people who work at Crouse and who had been attending the game to let them know that something has happened. The hospitals would also be monitoring 911 and would hear that. However it is likely that people would be walking in long before 911 would call. The cameras at Crouse can see the Dome so his officers could see what was going on outside the Dome. It's not likely that there would be any message over HillNet because on Saturday the SUNY-ESF Base is more likely to be staffed by student or civilians who aren't authorized to put any messages out over it.

Chris Dunham also noted that at Upstate, people would likely be arriving at the front door before there were any real knowledge of the situation. Mr. Donovan noted that since the Veterans Administration's Medical Center is across the street from the Carrier Dome it is likely that the VAMC would go on lockdown.

Mr. Marmon again advanced the scenario and stated that Onondaga County Emergency Management would declare this a Level 3 MCI. He noted that there are three levels of response in the county's MCI plan. Level 1, which would likely include five patients or less would be handled by the units already dispatched. Level 2, which is likely to have between 6-15 potential patients would result in sending six appropriately staffed ambulances and physicians would be notified. Level 3 is declared when any more than 15 patients may result, and at that point they would dispatch Emergency Management. They would notify Upstate and Crouse, and ambulances would be called to the scene. Channels would be assigned for further communication. It was noted that the hospitals would then activate the emergency plans based on the MCI. At Upstate they would notify the Incident Command Center at the hospital. However, Upstate would probably go on lockdown as it would likely already have an overflow of patients. Upstate would be controlling the entrances and exits.

Mr. Marmon noted that at Upstate there would be a roles and responsibilities triage. Priority 1 are those patients needing immediate care. Level 2 is an intermediate level. Level 3 would indicate minimal care and there is a 4th category for those expectant or those who have lost their lives. Patients would be tracked and the hospital may also prepare for possible decontamination. Mr. Dufford noted that Crouse would also likely been locked down and Crouse will also call the Upstate ER to notify them.

Mr. Dunham noted that one of the bigger challenges would be to get people who are outside the area into the hospital in order to staff the emergency department. Mr. Dunham noted that Upstate could be totally overwhelmed with patients and it's likely that those who need critical care would actually be sent to St. Joseph's emergency room because it's likely that the first people who walk in the door would be the people who need medical attention but are less injured. Mr. Marmon also noted that Upstate would be preparing to discharge patients to make room, however the hospital would expand beyond its capacity. There could be some transfers to different facilities and then the challenge is to transport people to other hospitals and to decide where and how it will be done. Mr. Dufford noted that Crouse would face the same challenge that the injured people who are mobile have probably walked in and overwhelm the emergency room. Ambulances are trying to move up the hill at the same time that officers are shutting down streets in order to allow emergency vehicles to move quickly. Mr. Donovan noted that since all the parking lots are filled there is also a challenge find a location to stage the ambulances.

Mr. Shoff noted that Adams and Crouse would be open for emergency vehicles only. The goal of the SPD to try to get people move away from Interstate 81 which would be the main emergency route and force people leaving the Carrier Dome to go east. Mr. Shoff also noted that between SPD and DPS there are a lot of police officers in and around the Dome and one challenge would be handling traffic as University Hill Institutional security may be asked to help the officers move the traffic at the intersections. Mr. Sardino noted that DPS would be in the Dome trying to find out what had happened. If they have determined there is not an active shooter and the Dome is safe there would be messaging on the P.A. to try to keep people in the Dome. People would be encouraged to get out if there was some immediate danger to them. The goal would be to get emergency vehicles in. Mike Walsh noted that if the game is suspended, people would want to leave. If the game is on television, people from all over the region would likely to know that something has happened at the Carrier Dome. Mr. Sardino noted that if the teams are going to be back in the locker room and they may wait; however if the game is done then the goal would be to try to have people leave in a controlled manner as possible.

Mr. Kavanagh noted that Irving Avenue would likely be choked with traffic so the goal would be to have SPD keep as many people in the parking lots as possible while the emergency is being dealt with. He noted that if Irving Avenue is blocked at that point the SPD may ask for help, but initially the SPD will try and handle the traffic. They would allow people to go to their car and garages but they would ask the garages to hold people and lock down the lots to avoid people from congesting the streets. Mr. Brown noted that Hutchings would have very few staff available and also has the challenge because of the dated communications equipment to talk to anyone, so they might be able to shut down the entrance of Hutchings but that's about all.

At the hospitals, Mr. Dufford noted that as the event continued ultimately the hospital would try to direct the least injured to go elsewhere. Mr. Dunham noted that Upstate would likely keep the shift that is on duty there and would call other people in. Mr. Donovan stated that many people who work for at the VA also work at Upstate, and the VA will open its emergency room and care for people. Mr. Dunham noted to get staff in they may direct staff who are outside Upstate to go to the community campus and then bus them into the main Upstate facility. They could also tell people to park at the 550 Harrison Building at the Biotech Accelerator, and other outlying lots and then be either transported or walk to the main hospital. He noted that all the emergency teams have their badges on so they are easy to identify.

Mr. Marmon then asked how they would that be handled? Mr. Kavanagh noted that there would be a staging area set up for the press. SPD would have a spokesperson to handle the incident and generally the goal would be to keep the media out of their way. Mr. Walsh noted that all of the local media would likely have somebody inside the Dome and Mr. Sardino responded that in that event the goal would be to get them to the press room. The S.U. Athletic Department could take care of the media and DPS would rely on the SPD public information officer to support. Mr. Shoff also noted that depending on the circumstance, SPD would want to use the media to try to let the public know if there is no further danger to anyone. Mr. Goldacker noted that another challenge would be that people would try to come into the Carrier Dome and the vicinity of the Hill particularly if they can't reach their relatives who are at the game. Mr. Sardino responded S.U. would direct relatives to Schine, Hendricks Chapel and Manley. Mr. Dufford noted that Crouse would not be able to answer whether patients are there.

Mr. Kavanagh stated that it's likely that the cell phone system would crash since the cell towers can only support a certain number of calls and the system does have a way to prioritize calls in the event of an emergency.


One of the lessons learned that Mr. Sardino noted was that the traffic evacuation plan is out of date and should be updated. He also noted that there should be a method to try to let the business people in University Hill know what is taking place. However, if it was a Saturday game it's highly unlikely that the University Hill office would be staffed.

Mr. Marmon noted that one of the other long-term concerns deals with memorials. People tend to build an impromptu memorial and there should be some thought about how that might be handled among the University Hill members since a lot of the materials can't be left there forever, but people will get upset if they are moved, so he suggested a policy on memorials be considered.

III. **OTHER BUSINESS AND ADJOURN**

Mr. LeRoy thanked the Upstate management folks for putting together the scenario and to Syracuse University for hosting the meeting.

With no further business to come before the meeting, it adjourned at 11:30am.



After-Action Report/Improvement Plan
Incident Date – January 14, 2019
Report Date – Jnauary 15, 2019

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DISCUSSION OVERVIEW

Event Name	Tabletop/Facilitated Discussion
Objectives	Identify communications pathways for both Law Enforcement and non Law Enforcement Partners, and identify how they would work. Identify any resource gaps that may occur during the initial response phase of an event and the need for outside resources Provide training on partnering with medical staff, and hospitals Explore integration between the various organizations Incident Command structures.
Sponsor	University Hill Corporation, University Hill Public Safety Association
Mission Area(s)	Response
Threat or Hazard	Emergent Evacuation and Multiple Casualty Incident
Scenario	Mechanical Issues causes loud “popping” sound and panic among spectators in the Carrier Dome, resulting in injured from trample during chaotic exit
Point of Contact	Chris Dunham, MBA Emergency Management Director SUNY Upstate Medical University and Hospital 750 East Adams Street Syracuse, NY 13210 Brad Marmon Emergency Management Coordinantor SUNY Upstate Medical University and Hospital 750 East Adams Street Syracuse, NY 13210

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SITUATION /SCENARIO

Cold, dry day - High in the mid teens after a large snowfall one day ago 8"-11". Syracuse basketball is playing a Saturday game against Louisville at 12pm. The attendance is projected to be between 28,000 - 29,000. During the second half of the game, a loud pop (x4) is heard around Section 108 and club 44. Spectators in the immediate area start to panic and rush toward the door. Trampled in many different sections between Gate B and Gate C

EVENT TIMELINE

Time	Event
1030	Start Discussion
1040	During the third quarter of the game, a loud pop (x4) is heard around Section 108 and club 44 Spectators in the immediate area start to panic and rush toward the door Trampled in many different sections between Gate B and Gate C
1045	Multiple calls to 911 stating several people hurt
	<i>Time compression</i>
1050	Syracuse Fire, AMR and SPD arrive and confirm multiple people about (30) hurt, several walking wounded
1105	Onondaga County Emergency Management activates a Level 3 MCI.
1110	Upstate is notified, EMS Physician to the scene, SFD, AMR. And SU MCI trailer dispatched and 12 ALS ambulances from Onondaga County
	<i>Time Compression</i>
1115	Triage area is setup, No active shooter confirmed
1115	Many people are walking around, wondering into the response zone and trying to get to their cars, Walking wounded are making there way to Crouse and VA Emergency Department entrances; Command is requesting a larger perimeter Requesting available officers to help with perimeter
1120	Media is calling and asking what's going on, along with arriving media vans Parents are calling the school asking what's going on, some are showing up on site
1140	End Discussion
1140	Hot Wash

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ANALYSIS OF CORE CAPABILITIES

Aligning Incident objectives and core capabilities provides a consistent taxonomy for evaluation that transcends individual Incidents to support preparedness reporting and trend analysis.

Table 1 includes the Incident objectives, aligned core capabilities, and performance ratings for each core capability as observed during the Incident and determined by the evaluation team.

Objectives	Core Capability	Performed without Challenge (P)	Performed with Some Challenges (S)	Performed with Major Challenges (M)	Unable to Perform (U)
Identify communications pathways for both Law Enforcement and non Law Enforcement Partners, and identify how they would work.	Information Sharing		S		
Identify any resource gaps that may occur during the initial response phase of an event and the need for outside resources	Emergency Operations Coordination	P			
Provide training on partnering with medical staff, and hospitals	Information Sharing	P			
Explore integration between the various organizations Incident Command structures.	Information Sharing		S		
<p>Ratings Definitions:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Performed without Challenges (P): The targets and critical tasks associated with the core capability were completed in a manner that achieved the objective(s) and did not negatively impact the performance of other activities. Performance of this activity did not contribute to additional health and/or safety risks for the public or for emergency workers, and it was conducted in accordance with applicable plans, policies, procedures, regulations, and laws. • Performed with Some Challenges (S): The targets and critical tasks associated with the core capability were completed in a manner that achieved the objective(s) and did not negatively impact the performance of other activities. Performance of this activity did not contribute to additional health and/or safety risks for the public or for emergency workers, and it was conducted in accordance with applicable plans, policies, procedures, regulations, and laws. However, opportunities to enhance effectiveness and/or efficiency were identified. • Performed with Major Challenges (M): The targets and critical tasks associated with the core capability were completed in a manner that achieved the objective(s), but some or all of the following were observed: demonstrated performance had a negative impact on the performance of other activities; contributed to additional health and/or safety risks for the public or for emergency workers; and/or was not conducted in accordance with applicable plans, policies, procedures, regulations, and laws. • Unable to be Performed (U): The targets and critical tasks associated with the core capability were not performed in a manner that achieved the objective(s). 					

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The following sections provide an overview of the performance related to each Incident objective and associated core capability, highlighting strengths and areas for improvement. The strengths and areas for improvement for each core capability aligned to this objective are described in this section.

CAPABILITY 1.

Objective: Identify communications pathways for both Law Enforcement and non Law Enforcement Partners, and identify how they would work

Strengths:

The partial capability level can be attributed to the following strengths

Strength 1: Established that SUNY ESF and Veterans Affairs would have a traffic detail

Strength 2: Use of campus alert to calm folks would be essential

Strength 3: Centro would be alerted that the game was let out early to accommodate shuttles and bus routes.

Areas for Improvement

The following areas require improvement to achieve the full capability level:

Area for Improvement 1: Use of hillnet on Saturday is a problem. Student manned system off hours

Analysis: Immediate notification of incidents across the hill would be hindered in the absence of hillnet during the weekend hours, as students do not work the system during that time. Members would rely on each other for notification.

Area for Improvement 2: Scanners would alert some departments but not all. Hospitals would not know status of event till much later

Analysis: Some hillcorp members can monitor the scanner for activity and notifications, however not all members have scanning capabilities. Hospitals would likely be notified through 911 or time and place presentations at the ED

Area for Improvement 3: Cell phone would be an issue – unreliable capacity.

Analysis: During large events, like games at the carrier dome, cellular service may be overwhelmed with volume of attempted calls. This may hinder patrons but also first responders who rely on text or call communications during incidents.

CAPABILITY 2.

Objective: Identify any resource gaps that may occur during the initial response phase of an event and the need for outside resources

Strengths

The partial capability level can be attributed to the following strengths:

Strength 1: Syracuse Police would investigate if active shooter present

Strength 2: Syracuse University DPS would investigate the initial incident

Strength 3: Syracuse University DPS has pre-planned staging for evacuated individuals – Shine, Hendrix Chapel

Strength 4: Veterans Affairs Hospital can help non-veterans in emergency.

Areas for Improvement

The following areas require improvement to achieve the full capability level:

Area for Improvement 1: Getting staff in to the hospitals with roads shut down or traffic gridlock.

Analysis: In a scenario that requires evacuation from the hill, a lot of traffic issues will be presented. If this scenario is coupled with an MCI where staff is being recalled to the local hospitals, several staff have the potential to be stuck in traffic while responding to the hospital. It was verbalized that Irving Ave would remain a priority to keep open.

CAPABILITY 3.

Objective: Provide training on partnering with medical staff, and hospitals

Strengths

The partial capability level can be attributed to the following strengths:

Strength 1: SUNY Upstate presented, and outlined the MCI Surge plan to participants

Strength 2: Onondaga County MCI plan was discussed

Strength 3: Learned that hospitals in the area would go on lockdown to protect Emergency Departments. Additionally, VA garage (which contracts Dome parking) would shut down exits to control traffic

Areas for Improvement

The following areas require improvement to achieve the full capability level:

Area for Improvement 1: Foot traffic self presenting to hospital may present an issue to hospitals and cause a lockdown

Analysis: Given the proximity to the carrier dome and easy accessibility of EDs within walking distance, some walking wounded may present at hospital emergency departments without any on scene triage.

Area for Improvement 2: EMS Staging

Analysis: Pre determined EMS staging would be an important factor as traffic and other pedestrian concerns may hinder EMS staging. Hill law enforcement would need rapid notification of staging plans from incident command in order to setup proper perimeters and traffic control measures.

CAPABILITY 4.

Objective: Explore integration between the various organizations Incident Command structures.

Strengths

The partial capability level can be attributed to the following strengths:

Strength 1: Learned that there are two incident command posts, one inside the dome and one outside.

Areas for Improvement

The following areas require improvement to achieve the full capability level:

Area for Improvement 1: Control of media inside and outside during the initial stage of the event would be an issue

Analysis: During a game, the media is already inside the building. The members verbalized possibly using the existing media center inside the dome to stage media, or setting up an area outside the perimeter for media if incident expanded.

APPENDIX A: IMPROVEMENT PLAN

This IP has been developed specifically for a facilitated discussion sponsored by University Hill Corp, on January 14, 2019.

Core Capability	Issue/Area for Improvement	Corrective Action	Cap Element ¹	Primary Response
CAPABILITY 1.	Use of hillnet on Saturday is a problem. Student manned system off hours	Assign staffing on the weekends to cover shifts	Personnel	HillCorp
	Scanners would alert some departments but not all. Hospitals would not know status of event till much later	Interoperability	Equipment	Hospital Emergency Management
	Cell phone would be an issue – unreliable capacity.	Plan for alternate communications. Sign up for GETS/WPS https://www.dhs.gov/cisa/government-emergency-telecommunications-service-gets	Equipment	Hillcorp All
CAPABILITY 2.	Getting staff in to the hospitals with roads shut down or traffic gridlock.	Pre-Plan routes with membership	Planning	Police, Hospital, HillCorp
CAPABILITY 3.	Foot traffic self presenting to hospital may present an issue to hospitals and cause a lockdown	Prepare, Plan and Exercise Surge Plans	Planning	Hospitals
	EMS Staging	Establish EMS Zones with SU (may already exist)	Planning	SU, Onondaga County OEM
CAPABILITY 4.	Control of media inside and outside during the initial stage of the event would be an issue	Pre-Plan (may already exist)	Planning	SU, HillCorp

¹ Capability Elements are: Planning, Organization, Equipment, Training, Incident, Policy, or Personnel.

APPENDIX B: INCIDENT PARTICIPANTS

Participating Organizations
University Hill Corp
SUNY ESF – EHS, Univ. Police
SUNY Upstate Univerisity Hospital - Emergency Management, Univ. Police
Syracuse University – Public Safety
Crouse Hospital – Security
Syracuse Police
Hutchings – Security
Veterans Affairs – Emergency Management, Police
Lemoyne College – Security
Centro Transportation – Security
Crouse Marshall – Security

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APPENDIX C: FEEDBACK FORMS ANALYSIS

	The exercise scenario was plausible and realistic.	Exercise participants included the right people in terms of level and mix of disciplines.	Participants were actively involved in the exercise.	Exercise participation was appropriate for someone in my field with my level of experience/training.	The exercise increased my understanding about and familiarity with the capabilities and resources of other participating organizations.	The exercise provided the opportunity to address significant decisions in support of critical mission areas.	After this exercise, I am better prepared to deal with the capabilities and hazards addressed.
MARK PETERELLI	5	4	4	4	4	3	3
MICHAEL BROWN	5	4	4	4	3	3	4
EJ DONOVAN	5	5	5	5	5	5	5
LAUREN SEBURN	5	5	5	4	5	5	4
RICHARD GOLDBACKER	5	5	5	4	5	5	5
MICHAEL J WALSH	5	5	5	5	5	5	5
ROBERT DUGAN	5	4	4	4	5	4	3
NICHOLAS NEWCOMB	5	5	5	5	4	5	4
AVG	5	4.6	4.6	4.3	4.5	4.3	4.1

“Hands on exercise would be helpful”,

“Powerpoint easily followed”, “Good Tabletop”,

“Helps understand what other agencies are doing”, “Need to improve ability of all players to communicate”,

“Next Step – Drill down on what specific agencies would do; How traffic flows, closures etc.”

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